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In The Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
EDWARD E. VALCARCE,
Plaintiff,
vs.

BRIEF OF
APPELLANTS
Case No. 9323

REED BITTERS and his
,vife, R01\IA BITTERS,
Defendants.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiff and Appellant in this action submits to
the Court that during the first part of January, 1958, the
Defendant, Reed Bitters, offered to sell to the Plaintiff,
Edward E. Valcarce, for pelt prices, a number of live mink.
The Defendant, Reed Bitters, had informed Plaintiff he
would have to pelt out 700 or 800 females and' send the
pelts to the company financing his operation in order to
reduce his debt to that company; that there would be a
saving to him in pelting and shipping costs if he were to
instead sell the live mink to the Plaintiff and send the
money received from the sale, rather than pelts, to the
loaning institution.
The Plaintiff agreed to this sale and accordingly gave
a check for $1500 to the Defendant, Mr. Bitters. One
hundred and· fifty female mink with SO males to cover
had been delivered to the Plaintiff immediately prior to
the time the check was handed to Mr. Bitters.
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Sh.ortly-tliereafter, approximately the lOth of January,
the Plaintiff delivered to Mr. Bitters a note for $2,700.
There is a considerable conflict in the testimony at this
point, the De fendant testifying that in consideration for
this note, additional mink were to be delivered by Mr.
Bitters to Mr. Valcarce; that Mr. Bitters would either lease
Mr. Valcarce a number of mink on a fifty-fifty basis, or
deliver a number of bred females (Tr. 7, 205, 208; PI) or
return the note to Mr. Valcarce (Tr. 7) The Defendant
testified (Tr 128) that there was no agreement for additional mink to be delivered as consideration. The testimony of an independent witness, Mr. Christensen, was
that Plaintiff and Defendant had made a "side agreement"
with regard to the note ( Tr 40.) The trial judge also
found there was a "side agreement" (Tr 207.)
There was also some conflict as to the date the note
and check were executed, the Defendant, Reed Bitters,
testifying that the check and note were made out at the
same time and in fact simultaneously ( Tr 80 and 81.)
However, the date on the check and the date on the note
(Ex 1 and 2) are different and there does not, therefore,
seem to be any question but what the note was prepared
on a day subsequent to the signing and delivery of the
check. (Also Tr 124.)
Considerable testimony was introduced at the trial
to contradict Plaintiff's statement that the 150 females
and 30 males which he purchased from the Defendants,
and paid for, were actually worth no more than he paid
for them by the check which is Exhibit 1. The Defendants
introduced witnesses to testify that breeder mink command much higher prices than those Plaintiff claims he
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paid. The Plaintiff has no quarrel whatsoever with this
claim, or with the testimony of the witnesses produced
on behalf of Defendants. He readily admits that breeder
mink sells for considerably more than he claims he paid
for Defendant's mink; his claim is that the Defendant,
:\lr. Bitters, offered and did sell to him the mink for pelt
prices for the reason that he had been required to pelt
down a considerable number of breeder stock for the
purpose of reducing a large indebtedness to the company
financing his operation.
It is important to note at this point that Plaintiff and
Defendants were well acquainted and had been friends
for many years; that they had had other business dealings,
"both verbal and otherwise" ( Tr. 5.) The Plaintiff would,
therefore, not have any reason to fear that another verbal
agreement, that of a future delivery of mink, as considerationa for a note which the Defendant, Mr. Bitters, requested the Plaintiff to deliver to him as a favor and to
help out in a difficult financial situation, would not be
honored and fully complied with by the Defendants.
The Plaintiff testified of several conversations with
~Ir. Bitters in which Mr. Bitters stated they would be
sure and get something worked out.
When it appeared to the Plaintiff that the Defendant,
~1r. Bitters, was not going to perform his promise and
deliver the mink as consideration for the note, the Plaintiff demanded the note back. The Plaintiff testified that
the Defendant, Mr. Bitters, told him he had misplaced
the note, but until he could find it he would give the
Plaintiff a statement stating he claimed no liens or encum-
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brances of any kind against Plaintiffs mink ·(Tr. 9), which
the Defendant, Mr. Bitters, did on the 31st day of May,
1958. (Pl. Exh. 2.)

When the Defendants still failed to produce the note
or any mink in consideration therefor, Plaintiff commenced legal action in the District Court to either require
the Defendants to deliver a reasonable number of mink
as consideration for the note or return the note to the
Plaintiff. It is from a judgment dismissing the action that
Plaintiff now appeals.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
In support of this appeal Plaintiff contends:
POINT 1
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT NUMBERED 1 AND 2,
ITS CONCLUSION OF LAW, AND ITS JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANTS.
A.

FINDING OF FACT NO. 1 AND FINDING OF
FACT NO. 2 ARE NOT CONSISTENT.

B.

THE COURT HAVING RECOGNIZED THAT
THERE WAS AN ORAL AGREEMENT AFFECTING THE CONSIDERATION FOR THE
NOTE IN QUESTION HAD A DUTY TORECOGNIZE THE SUBSTANCE OF THAT ORAL
AGREEMENT AND RESOLVE THE EQUITIES BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

C.

THE EVIDENCE SHOWS AND THE COURT
DOES NOT FIND TO THE CONTRARY
THAT THE WRITTEN NOTE WAS NOT THE
ENTIRE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

AND THAT THE COURT WAS THEREFORE
IN ERROR IN FAILING TO GIVE VALIDITY
TO THE ADDITIONAL TERMS OF THE ENTIRE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES, WHICH VERBAL AGREEMENT CONTEMPLATED THE GIVING OF ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATION FOR THE NOTE
IN QUESTION.
POINT 2
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE
EFFECT TO THE STATEMENT OF THE DEFENDANT, MR. BITTERS, THAT HE DID NOT HAVE "ANY
CLAIM, MORTGAGE, OR LIEN OF ANY KIND ON
ANY 1\IINK" ON PLAINTIFF'S RANCH.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT NUMBERED 1 AND 2,
ITS CONCDLUSION OF LAW, AND ITS JUDGMENT
IN FA\?OR OF THE DEFENDANTS.
A.

FINDING OF FACT NO.1 AND FINDING OF
FACT NO. 2 ARE NOT CONSISTENT.

It should suffice to point out that in its Finding of
Fact No. 1 the Court finds that the plaintiff paid for certain mink by check and promissory note, the Plaintiff
receiving fair value for the execution and delivery of said
note; and then in its Finding of Fact No. 2, finds that
there were, in fact, other agreements or side-arrangements,
but determining that it could not recognize or enforce
them because of their indefiniteness.
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- "it- ~is. difficult to -~n~-lerstancf
the Plaintiff could
have been more definite in explaining the side agreement
than his statement that the Defendant, Mr. Bitters, was
to deliver some 60 bred females in March and when he
did not do this, was to lease 400 or 500 females, with males,
to cover, to the Plaintiff, on a fifty-fifty basis. In the
event Mr. Bitter's loaning institution foreclosed against
him, the Plaintiff would then pay for the note through
the leasing agreement, and the Defendant, Mr. Bitters,
would take the balance of his share due him under the
ranching agreement with the Plaintiff in mink, and this
would assure Mr. Bitters being able to stay in the mink
ranching business. If the lending institution did not
foreclose Mr. Bitters, the note was to be returned. (Tr.
7, 8.) Mr. Bitters was not foreclosed, neither was the
note returned nor the additional mink delivered. Mter
the original agreement failed, the Plaintiff proposed other
alternatives, which the Defendant, Mr. Bitters, promised
to work out but did not.
Such an agreement as that described would seem
clear, and capable of interpretation and execution under
the supervision of a court of equity.
If for some reason the Defendants are not in a position to complete their agreement, the legal principal which
applies is that the Court, having taken jurisdiction, can
award damages to assure that equity is had:
"Under the rule that equity having assumed jurisdiction of a case may retain it to do full justice, it is
proper for the court to ascertain and award the damages flowing from the wrong which is the basis of
equitable relief." SO C. J. S. Equity, Sec. 72, Damages, P. 424
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"Where case is brought in equity~ and proved
facts support allegations of complaint entitling plaintiff to equitable relief, court having obtained jurisdiction over cause will, in exercise of its equity jurisdiction, proceed to decide whole issues and award
complete relief, although rights of parties may be
strictly legal and damages will be awarded in substitution for or in addition to equitable relief." Wasatch Oil Refining Co. vs. Wade, Judge, et al. 92 Utah
50, 1936, ( 63 P. 2d 1070)
The Plaintiff having proved, and the Court recognized, there was a side agreement, the Plaintiff, it would
seem, is entitled to equitable relief and if the Defendants
because of a change in their circumstances, are unable to
perform the side agreement, certainly the court, in equity,
can and should award reasonable damages.
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT NUMBERED 1 AND 2,
ITS CONCLUSION OF LAW, AND ITS JUDGMENT
IN FA \ 70R OF THE DEFENDANTS.
B.

THE COURT HAVING RECOGNIZED THAT
THERE WAS AN ORAL AGREEMENT AFFECTING THE CONSIDERATION FOR THE
NOTE IN QUESTION HAD A DUTY TO RECOGNIZE THE SUBSTANCE OF THAT ORAL
AGREE~1ENT AND RESOLVE THE EQUITIES BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

Though the fact situations do not apply to the case
in question, two Utah cases have announced principles
which are applicable. In the first: Jones Min. Co. vs.
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Cardiff 1\Jin: & Mill Co. et al., 56 Utah 449, 1920, ( 191
Pac. 426) the Justice writing the opinion states:
"I unhesitatingly assert that a Court of equity
should not permit a wrong doer to profit by his
wrong. "
And the Second: Hansen vs. Abraham
Utah 361. ( 1933) (2.5 P. 2d. 76)

I1T.

Co. 82

"Equity will look, not to the mere form or shadow
of a transaction, but to the substance of it and to the
real transaction had between the parties."
Certainly, if there was a side agreement, as the Court
recognizes there was, the defendants have been allowed
to profit by their wrong by the failure of the Court to
look at the substance of the real transaction and determine,
in view of the failure of the defendants, the equities of
the parties.
As the case of Bowen vs. Hockley, 71 F. 2d. 781
( 1934, Cited at 94 A L R 856)
"One of the glories of equity jurisprudence is that it
is not bound by the strict rules of the common law,
but can mold its decrees to do justice amid all the
vicissitudes and intricacies of life. The principles
upon which it proceeds are eternal; but their application in a changing world \vill necessarily change to
meet changed situations. If relief had not been
granted only where precedent could be found for it,
this great system would never have been developed;
and, if such a narrow view of equitable powers is
adopted now, the result will be the return of the rigid
and unyielding system which equity jurisprudence
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was designed to remedy. As was well said by Prof.
Pomery (Equity Jurisprudence (4th Ed.) Sec. 60):
... In fact, there is no limit to the various forms and
kinds of specific remedy which he may grant, adopted
to novel conditions of right and obligation, which are
constant!~, arising from the n1ovements of society."
and further, citing 19 Am. Jur. Equity, Sec 451, n. 3, P.
311:

"The fact that there is no wrong without a
remedy has been the boast of many of the sages of
the law from early times. Says Lord Coke (Co. Lit.
197, b. 1 Thomas's Coke, 9020: "The law wills that,
in every case where a man is wronged and enclanged, he shall have a remedy." And Lord Holt
has said: "if the plaintiff has a right, he must of
necessity have a means to vindicate and maintain it. .
It is a vain thing to imagine a right without a remedy.
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT NUMBERED 1 AND 2,
ITS CONCLUSION OF LAW, AND ITS JUDGMENT
IN FA. VOR OF THE DEFENDANTS.
C. THE EVIDENCE SHOWS AND THE COURT
DOES NOT FIND TO THE CONTRARY,
THAT THE WRITTEN NOTE WAS NOT THE
ENTIRE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES AND
THE COURT WAS THEREFORE IN ERROR IN
FAILING TO GIVE VALIDITY TO THE ADDITIONAL TER:\IS OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES, WHICH VERBAL
AGREEMENT CONTEMPLATED THE GIVING
OF ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATION FOR THE
NOTE I~ QUESTION.
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-It js ,a well settled principle of the law that oral evidence, as between the parties, can be introduced to show
consideration, or want of consideration, for a note.
"The fact that a note on its fact purports to be
for value received does not preclude the defense of
want of consideration."
7 Am Jur, Bills and Notes, Sec. 249, P. 943 n. 9 ( 108
P. 914, Mont.)
"Parol or extrinsic evidence affecting bills and
notes is governed by much the same rules as govern
the admissibility of such evidence generally. Classified with reference to the extrinsic facts sought to be
shown, the evidence may relate to oral agreements
between the parties not embodied in the writing, or
to facts and circumstances which surround the parties
at the time of the contract, and by which it is sought
to show their intention. The oral agreements sought
to be shown may be prior or contemporaneous with
the execution of the writing or they may be subsequent thereto ... and as between the original parties
... parol evidence has always been admitted to show
fraud, want or failure of consideration ... or to show
that the writing is only a part of an entire oral contract between the parties, or that its obligation has
been fully discharged by an oral collateral agreement.
So, in a controversy between the parties ... proof may
be made of a collateral agreement which was the
consideration for the instrument, or which postponed
the legal operation of the writing until the happening
of a contingency. Again, an instrument is to be
constued. . . in the light of its subject matter and
the circumstances in which and the purposes for
which it was executed evidence of which is always
admissible in the construction of written contracts, in
order to put the Court in the position of the parties."
(Emphasis added)
8 Am Jur, Bills and Notes, Sec. 1049, P. 630 and 631
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Although notes are presumed to have been issued
for a valuable consideration to the maker, in action
on notes where evidence is offered tending to overcome this presumption, the burden of proof is again
cast on the plaintiff.
Finder vs. Morris ~Iiller & Co., 52 NE 2d. 1023

(Ill.)
"Where the payee of a note fails to furnish the
promised main or chief consideration therefor, the
defendant maker should be relieved from paying the
note sued on." Pappas vs. Courembis 82 A 2d. 757.
Since the evidence in this case shows the existence of
such an oral contract, of which the note was merely a part,
as would come within the principles set forth in the cases
cited above and there is no contradiction in the evidence
or findings of the Court that such oral contract, or side
agreements were not performed by the defendants, the
plaintiff submits that the note in question, if the equities
thereof can not be adjusted by a Court of equity, fails for
want of consideration, and cites in support thereof the
Utah State Code Annotated, 1953,
"44-1-29. Effect of Want of Consideration. "Absence or failure of consideration is matter of defense as against any person not a holder in due course,
and partial failure of consideration is a defense pro
tanto whether the failure is an ascertained and liquidated amount or otherwise.n (Emphasis added)
Plaintiff further cites in support of his proposition
two cases which have been decided under this section:
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Under·this··section, in action by payee on
note, want or failure of consideration may be shown
if presented by averments contained in answer, by
showing any arrangement entered into between the
parties that is not illegal or unreasonable. Smith vs.
Brown, 50 U. 27, 165 P. 468, followed in Harris vs.
Wilstead, 114 U. 496, 201 P. 2d 491.

· '·· ·.

Considerable authority has been quoted to support
the legal proposition that oral evidence may be introduced
to show that a writing, such as the note in question, is
only part of an entire agreement between parties, that
such an agreement may contemplate the furnishing of
consideration for the note, and if the agreement fails, the
maker thereof should be relieved from paying the note
sued on.
The purpose of the lengthy quotations was not to
suggest any failure on the part of the trial judge to admit
testimony pertaining to any oral agreements connected
with or pertinent to the note in question. The purpose
was to point out that when such testimony has established
as a fact that there was an oral agreement, and that the
oral agreement failed, such fact should, and in fact, must,
be considered by the Court in making it decision.
That the trial judge in this case had a rather strong
prejudice against oral agreements, appears from the statements in his announced judgment:
"I can't bring myself to enforce a speculative, inchoate
contract where I can't figure out what the terms of
it are. I find that there was some talk about a side
contract, but for the life of me I can't find out what
the terms of it were. So the plaintiff, having elected
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to deal in secret arrangements, behind-door deals,
will have to suffer the consequences I just can't take
my needle and thread and weave a contract."
While we may sympathize with the feelings of the
judge just because he does not like "secret arrangements"
and refuses to consider anything except what is in writing
because of that dislike, a party who has been wronged,
\vho has entered into an agreement with a payee of a note,
and has watched that agreement fail in spite of numerous
efforts to work out a compromise and a solution, should
not be denied justice in a court of equity.
"The most striking and distinctive feature of courts
of equity is that they can adapt their decrees to all
the varieties of circumstances which may arise and
so adjust them to all the peculiar rights, mutual and
adverse, of all the parties in interest."
19 Am. Jur., Equity, Sec. 123, n. 17
(Citing Higginbottom vs. Short, 25 Miss. 160,
57 Am. Dec. 198)
"The maxim that equity will not suffer a wrong to be
without a remedy, is probably the most important
of the principles which were addressed to the court
or chancellor."
19 Am. Jur. Equity, Sec. 451
Though it would perhaps have been difficult for the
trial judge to adjust the peculiar rights of the parties to
this action, the court of equity, for that reason, cannot
permit the Plaintiff to suffer for the wrong of the Defandants in failing to complete the oral agreement, but
must apply the principles of equity to his decree and find
a remedy.
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··POINT 2
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE
EFFECT TO THE STATEMENT OF THE DEFENDANT, MR. BITTERS, THAT HE DID NO HAVE "ANY
CLAIM, MORTGAGE, OR LEIN OF ANY KIND ON
ANY MINK" ON PLAINTIFF'S RANCH.
There is no conflict in the evidence that the consideration for the note in question was mink, that the note was
given as payment for mink. Neither is there any conflict,
as has been stated before, that there were side agreements
contemplated in connection with payment for the note.
In view of these uncontroverted facts, Plaintiff submits
that the legal effect of the statement made by the defendant Mr. Bitters, that he did not have any claim mortgage, or lien of any kind on any mink on the plaintiff's
ranch is an admission on Mr. Bitters part that the note
was actually paid.
Mr. Bitters' statement on cross examination would
seem to confirm this: ( Tr. 152)

"Q. I'm asking you, if the note said, if the note
stated, "I do not have any mortgage or any lien on any
mink on Ed Valcarce's ranch," then that would mean
he didn't owe you for the note, because the note you
have testified to - (was for the balance of the mink,
as you have claimed)
"A. I don't understand it.
true."

I think that's probably

The testimony of the Defendant, Mrs. Bitters, suggest
the same: (Tr. 188)
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"Q. But you still didn't want him to sign the statement?
"A.

N 0.

"Q. Because if he signed it he couldn't ranch mink?
"A. I was a little inclined to think that this statement
would have some bearing on the note that Mr. Valcarce had signed with us, and its collection. That
was the main reason."
The Defendant, Reed Bitters, while denying that he
ever agreed to ranch mink with Mr. Valcarce as consideration for the note in question, testified that if he had a
good year, he would lease the Plaintiff some mink. The
Court determined, that in view of the testimony of Mr.
Christensen, referred to above, whether or not Mr. Bitters
had a good year was significant. The trial was therefore
continued to a later date at which time testimony on this
point could be taken. After considerable discussion on
this point, Mr. Bitters agreed that he had had a good year
so far as the production of a kit crop was concerned, and
that the statement would be the determining factor
(Tr. 175).
~Ir.

Bitters' position then became that so long
as Mr. Valcarce held a paper stating that he, Mr.
Bitters, did not have any claim, mortgage, or lien of any
kind on any n1ink on Plaintiff's ranch, he couldn't ranch
any mink with the Plaintiff ( Tr. 151, 158). However, the
evidence is clear that ~1r. Valcarce needed the statement
for a particular purpose, that of obtaining financing for
his operation (Tr. 62) and that the circumstance referred
to a particular date ( Tr. 200). Logic would prove that
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once "financmg was obtained, and the loaning· agency had
its usual mink count, there would be no further restrictions
upon any arrangements for moving in additional mink
which the grower wanted to make. The Defendant, Reed
Bitters testified there would be no restriction as he attempted to impose at the trial, as evidenced· by his own
testimony: (Tr, 198)

"Q. Now, Mr. Bitters, at one time - I don't remember which day of trial it was - but you have testified,
have you not, that mink can still be ranched on another farm,. even. though the mink owned by that
ranch are mortgaged, is that correct?
"A. y es. ,
In v;iew of the testimony referred to, it would seem
clear that Mr. Bitters intended, by signing a statement
that he did not have any claim, mortgage, or lien of any
kind on any mink on Plaintiff's ranch, to absolve Mr.
Valcarce of any obligation on the note he had signed.
It would further seem clear that Mr. Bitters' contention he could not ranch mink with Mr. Valcarce because of the statement is not valid, but was a stratagem
invented to meet an exigency created by the serious financial difficulty in which Mr. Bitters found himself and
which he had sought to alleviate by wrongfully pledging
a note without consideration, a note which he had no
right to claim unless and until he complied with his many
promises to work out the consideration with the maker
thereof.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, appellant respectfully requests that the
Court reverse the decision of the Honorable Lewis Jones
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dismissing the complaint filed by appellant in the district
court, which complaint was filed by appellant for the purpose of enforcing an oral agreement between the parties
whereby respondent was to deliver additional mink as
consideration for the promissory note in question, the trial
court having found there was such an oral agreement but
denying relief on the grounds of an alleged indefiniteness
of the terms of the "side agreement," when in fact those
tenns were clear and capable of interpretation by a court
of equity; and further denying relief on the basis of a
personal dislike for any part of an agreement not in writing, a dislike for "secret arrangements and behind-door
deals," all of which statements and decision are contrary
to the principles and powers of equity jurisprudence, and
for the further reason that the evidence shows that the
Defendant, Mr. Bitters signed a statement that he did not
have any claim, mortgage or lien on any mink on
Plaintiff's ranch, which statement was in effect, and was
intended to be an admission on the part of the Defendant
that the note in question had been paid.
Respectfully submitted,
SHERMA HANSEN,
Attorney for Appellant.
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